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NOTE
Search Incident to Probable Cause?:
The Intersection of Rawlings and Knowles
Marissa Perry*
The search incident to arrest exception authorizes an officer to search an ar-
restee’s person and his or her area of immediate control. This exception is
based on two historical justifications: officer safety and evidence preservation.
While much of search incident to arrest doctrine is settled, tension exists be-
tween two Supreme Court cases, Rawlings v. Kentucky and Knowles v. Iowa,
and a crucial question remains unanswered: Must an officer decide to make
an arrest prior to commencing a search? In Rawlings, the Supreme Court
stated that a search may precede a formal arrest if the arrest follows quickly
thereafter. In Knowles, the Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s reasoning
that a search is valid so long as an officer has probable cause to make an
arrest, even if an arrest never happens. This tension has led to differing inter-
pretations among the lower courts, resulting in three different readings of
Rawlings. This Note argues that Supreme Court should settle the lower courts’
varied interpretations of Rawlings and Knowles and answer the unresolved
question. It proposes a new rule and argues that the Supreme Court  should
hold that in order for a search incident to arrest to be valid, the officer must
intend to make an arrest before commencing the search.
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Introduction
One of the most important exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s war-
rant requirement is a search incident to arrest, which allows an officer to
search a person and his or her area of immediate control.1 There is an un-
resolved question in search incident to arrest doctrine that arises frequently:
When can the search precede the arrest? In particular, must the officer have
already decided to make an arrest prior to commencing the search? The
Supreme Court has not resolved this question, though it has touched on the
issue in two cases that are in tension with one another.2 The issue has also
divided the lower courts.3 This question ought to be settled, and the Su-
preme Court should be the one to resolve it. This Note addresses how the
Supreme Court might resolve the question and explains the legal and practi-
cal concerns that justify its resolution by our nation’s highest Court.
Much of the search incident to arrest doctrine is settled. The two justifi-
cations for the exception are officer safety and evidence preservation. These
justifications define the scope of a search incident to arrest, which is limited
to a search of the arrestee’s person and any items within his or her immedi-
ate control.4 If the arrested individual is a recent occupant of a vehicle, the
police officer may, in certain instances, also conduct a search of the vehicle.5
The exception provides police officers with “an unqualified right to search”
any individual they arrest.6 The officer need not obtain a search warrant
1. If the person arrested is an occupant or recent occupant of a car, the right to search
may extend to the interior of the vehicle. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009).
2. Compare Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), with Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S.
113 (1998).
3. Compare United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 951–52 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
so long as there is probable cause to arrest and the search is conducted soon thereafter, the
search is valid as incident to arrest), and United States v. Anchondo, 156 F.3d 1043, 1045–46
(10th Cir. 1998) (same), and United States v. Ilazi, 730 F.2d 1120, 1126–27 (8th Cir. 1984)
(same), with United States v. Patiutka, 804 F.3d 684, 688 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Rawlings for
the proposition that the search may precede arrest so long as probable cause existed prior to
the search), and United States v. Abney, 496 F. App’x 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2012) (same), and
United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 216–17 (1st Cir. 1997) (same), and United States v.
Banshee, 91 F.3d 99, 102 (11th Cir. 1996) (same), and United States v. Hernandez, 825 F.2d
846, 852 (5th Cir. 1987) (same), and United States v. Donaldson, 793 F.2d 498, 503 (2d Cir.
1986) (same), and with United States v. Powell, 483 F.3d 836, 839–41 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (holding that because there was probable cause, the formal arrest could follow quickly
after the search, while emphasizing “we do not say that having probable cause to arrest is by
itself sufficient”), and United States v. Williams, 170 F. App’x 399, 404–05 (6th Cir. 2006)
(upholding a search that preceded an arrest because the “officers took preliminary steps to-
wards a formal arrest based upon existing probable cause”), and with Ochana v. Flores, 347
F.3d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a defendant must be under custodial arrest at the
time of the search).
4. Searches Incident to Valid Arrests, 44 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 82, 82–84
(2015).
5. Id. at 85; see infra text accompanying notes 52–54.
6. Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to
Arrest, 19 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 381, 381 (2001).
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prior to conducting such a search.7 The exception does not require an officer
to have probable cause to believe that evidence from the crime that the sus-
pect was arrested for will be found; nor is it limited to situations in which
the arrested individual is more likely to possess dangerous weapons due to
the nature of the crime committed.8 Crucially, in order for the search to be
lawful, the police officer may not use evidence obtained from a search inci-
dent to arrest to justify a finding of probable cause to arrest.9
Uncertainty still exists, however, concerning when a search incident to
arrest may lawfully precede an arrest. The Supreme Court has touched on
this question in two cases: Rawlings v. Kentucky10 and Knowles v. Iowa.11 In
Rawlings, officers searched Rawlings after he admitted ownership of a large
quantity of illegal drugs, but before the police officers had arrested him.12
The Court upheld the search as incident to arrest, stating that “[w]here the
formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of peti-
tioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search
preceded the arrest rather than vice versa” so long as probable cause existed
prior to the search.13 In Knowles, an officer conducted a search of Knowles’s
vehicle after issuing him a citation for speeding.14 The Iowa Supreme Court
upheld the search, reasoning that “so long as the arresting officer had proba-
ble cause to make a custodial arrest, there need not in fact have been a
custodial arrest” to justify the search.15 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that “neither of the[ ] underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest
exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.”16
The tension between these two cases has led to division among the lower
courts on this crucial issue. The majority of circuit courts have cited Rawl-
ings to uphold searches that precede an arrest.17 The Eighth, Ninth, and
7. Id.
8. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“The authority to search the
person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to
discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of
the suspect.”); see also Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A
Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 Temp. L.
Rev. 221, 226 (1989) (“Search incident to arrest differs from other exceptions to the warrant
requirement in that it not only permits the government to search without a warrant, but also
permits a search without probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity will be
found during the search.”).
9. See Searches Incident to Valid Arrests, supra note 4, at 86–87.
10. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
11. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
12. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111.
13. Id.
14. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 114.
15. Id. at 115–16.
16. Id. at 117.
17. See United States v. Patiutka, 804 F.3d 684, 688 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Abney, 496 F. App’x 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Powell, 483 F.3d 836, 838–39
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Williams, 170 F. App’x 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2006);
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Tenth Circuits have articulated a “two-part test,” stating that, so long as
probable cause exists prior to the search and an arrest follows soon thereaf-
ter, the timing of the search is not important.18 Other courts, including the
Seventh Circuit and several state supreme courts, have held that more than
probable cause is needed to justify a search incident to arrest.19
This issue is important to resolve for two reasons. First, it is unclear that
mere probable cause to arrest triggers the rationales used to justify the
search incident to arrest. The Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Robinson—and reaffirmed in Knowles—that concerns for officer safety
“flow[ ] from the fact of the arrest.”20 The Supreme Court has reasoned sim-
ilarly when discussing the second rationale for the exception, evidence pres-
ervation.21 Only one circuit court has said that the concerns for officer safety
and evidence preservation are as apparent before an arrest,22 and the Su-
preme Court has yet to express its opinion on this question. If these con-
cerns are not present before an arrest, the two-part test risks untethering the
rule from its justifications.
Second, there are serious practical implications to consider when evalu-
ating the multiple approaches lower courts have taken in analyzing this
question. Under the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits’ approach, as long as
officers had probable cause to arrest an individual for an offense, they could
conduct a search of his person, any items within his or her immediate con-
trol, and potentially a vehicle, if he was considered a recent occupant
thereof, before the officer determined whether or not he was going to arrest
the individual.23 Considering the high number of arrestable offenses for
which officers generally issue a warning or citation, the practical conse-
quence of the rule articulated by the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits cre-
ates a substantial risk for pretextual searches.
This Note contends that, in addition to probable cause and an arrest
that follows quickly thereafter, a valid search incident to arrest requires that
the officer intended to arrest the person prior to commencing the search. By
United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 217 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Banshee, 91 F.3d 99,
102 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hernandez, 825 F.2d 846, 852 (5th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Donaldson, 793 F.2d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 1986).
18. See United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 952 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Anchondo, 156 F.3d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ilazi, 730 F.2d 1120,
1126–27 (8th Cir. 1984).
19. See Ochana v. Flores, 347 F.3d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 2003); People v. Reid, 26 N.E.3d
237, 240 (N.Y. 2014); State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 299–300 (Tenn. 1999).
20. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5
(1973)).
21. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (“Where there is no formal arrest, as
in the case before us, a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take
conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence on his person.”); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969).
22. United States v. Powell, 483 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (contending that
concerns for officer safety and evidence preservation are greater before a police officer takes a
suspect into custody than they are after).
23. See supra note 18.
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adopting a reading of Rawlings that does not require that the officer in-
tended to arrest, lower courts risk transforming the search incident to arrest
exception into a search incident to probable cause exception.
This note proceeds as follows. Part I provides a summary of modern
search incident to arrest doctrine. Part II compares the competing interpre-
tations of the intersection of Rawlings and Knowles at the lower court level.
Part III contends that the Supreme Court should resolve this unsettled ques-
tion and hold that in order for a search incident to arrest to be valid, the
officer must intend to make an arrest before commencing the search.
I. Modern Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine
This Part provides an overview of the modern search incident to arrest
doctrine. It begins with a discussion of Chimel v. California, which articu-
lated the two justifications for the search incident to arrest exception, and
United States v. Robinson, which established a bright-line rule that the excep-
tion is triggered by the arrest itself. Part I then addresses the search incident
to arrest exception in the vehicle context, providing an overview of New York
v. Belton and Arizona v. Gant. It concludes with a synopsis of Rawlings v.
Kentucky and Knowles v. Iowa, the analysis of which is crucial to the question
at the heart of this Note: Must an officer decide to make an arrest prior to
commencing the search?
Chimel v. California24 announced the justifications underlying search in-
cident to arrest for the first time.25 In Chimel, three police officers arrived at
Chimel’s home with a warrant for his arrest for the burglary of a coin
shop.26 The officers did not have a search warrant, but requested Chimel’s
permission to “look around.”27 Chimel denied the officer’s request; the of-
ficers nonetheless conducted a full search of defendant’s entire home, stating
that they had the authority to do so “on the basis of the lawful arrest.”28 In a
search lasting forty-five to sixty minutes,29 the police officers seized a num-
ber of items as evidence, including coins, medals, and tokens.30 Items seized
from Chimel’s home were subsequently admitted into evidence against him
at his trial in state court for burglary.31 Chimel objected to the admission of
this evidence, arguing that the items had been unconstitutionally seized.32
The court overruled his objection and subsequently convicted him.33 Both
the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court affirmed,
24. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
25. Logan, supra note 6, at 391.
26. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 753–54.
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holding that because the officers had arrested Chimel, searching his home
was lawful as incident to a lawful arrest.34
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether the war-
rantless search of the petitioner’s entire house can be constitutionally justi-
fied as incident to that arrest.”35 Recognizing that the constitutional standard
for search incident to arrest had been “far from consistent” since its first
approval of the exception in Weeks v. United States,36 the Court began its
analysis with an overview of its conflicting opinions on the scope of a search
incident to arrest.37
The Court emphasized the importance of the background and purpose
of the Fourth Amendment in determining the scope of this exception.38 It
determined that its analysis in Terry v. Ohio, that “[t]he scope of [a] search
must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered
its initiation permissible,” is applicable to the search incident to arrest ex-
ception.39 It then went on to articulate the two justifications for a search
incident to arrest:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search
the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its conceal-
ment or destruction.40
The Court explained that these two justifications for the search incident to
arrest exception, officer safety and the preservation of evidence, defined the
scope of a search to be “a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within
his immediate control.’ ”41 Because the search went beyond the defendant’s
person and area within his immediate control, the Court explained, evi-
dence of the items seized should have been suppressed.42
While Chimel articulated the two reasons that trigger the search incident
to arrest exception, it left open the question of whether officers always have
the right to search incident to an arrest.43 Chimel did not address whether
the right to conduct a search incident to arrest depends on probable cause
34. Id. at 754–55.
35. Id. at 755.
36. Id. (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
37. Id. at 755–60.
38. Id. at 760–61.
39. Id. at 762 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
40. Id. at 762–63.
41. Id. at 763.
42. Id. at 768.
43. Logan, supra note 6, at 392.
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that the arrestee had a weapon or evidence to conceal on his person or
within his or her immediate control.44
The Court determined that an arrest provides a categorical right to
search in United States v. Robinson.45 It explained that while the justifications
for the search incident to arrest exception are based on officer safety and
preservation of evidence, the authority to conduct such a search is not de-
pendent on the probability that the police officer will find weapons or evi-
dence.46 The justifications for the exception are triggered at the moment of
arrest: “[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest,
and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the
grounds for arrest.”47 In other words, it is the arrest that justifies the search,
not the existence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion that an officer
would find a weapon or concealed evidence when conducting the search.
The Court has also addressed the scope of a search incident to arrest in
the context of vehicle searches. In New York v. Belton, the Court acknowl-
edged that although Chimel clearly stated that the scope of a search incident
to arrest should not extend beyond the area within the immediate control of
the arrested person, it did not provide a workable definition of “the area
within the immediate control of the arrestee” for courts and police officers.48
The Court assumed that, generally speaking, articles inside the passenger
compartment of a vehicle are “within ‘the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].’ ”49 Based on this
assumption and a desire to create a bright line rule, the Court concluded
that the scope of a search incident to an arrest of an occupant of a vehicle
includes a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, and any con-
tainers found therein.50 For years, many courts understood Belton to allow a
search of an automobile as incident to the arrest of an occupant even if it
was impossible for the arrestee to gain access to the vehicle at the time of the
search.51
44. Id.
45. 414 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
46. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
47. Id. at 234 n.5.
48. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
49. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (alteration in original) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
50. Id. at 460–61 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, and Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959)). In concluding that the search incident to arrest of an occupant of a vehicle in-
cluded search of the passenger compartment and any containers located therein, the Court was
also motivated in part by the need for straightforward rules: “Fourth Amendment doctrine . . .
is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be
expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law enforce-
ment activities in which they are necessarily engaged.” Id. at 458 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave,
“Case-by-Case Adjudication” versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974
Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 141).
51. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341 (2009).
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The Court rejected this interpretation in Arizona v. Gant, noting that
authorizing a categorical right to search a vehicle incident to a “recent occu-
pant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying
the Chimel exception—a result clearly incompatible with Belton.”52 Instead,
the Court held that the Chimel justifications authorize a search of a vehicle
as incident to the arrest of a recent occupant “only when the arrestee is
unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at
the time of the search.”53
The Gant Court also recognized that the unique circumstance of vehi-
cles justifies a search of the vehicle’s passenger compartment in cases when it
is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be
found in the vehicle.”54 Importantly, this additional exception would not
come into play in the case of an arrest for a traffic violation, as there would
be no reasonable basis for a police officer to conclude that evidence of the
traffic violation was present in the vehicle. The Court has also recently de-
clined to extend the search incident to arrest exception to electronic data on
cell phones on the basis that such an extension would “untether the rule
from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception.”55
Two Supreme Court cases, Rawlings and Knowles, seem to be in tension
with one another. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, police officers arrived at Law-
rence Marquess’s house with a warrant for his arrest on drug distribution
charges.56 Marquess was not present; however, one of his housemates and
four visitors, including Rawlings, were present.57 While searching for Mar-
quess, the officers smelled and visually observed marijuana.58 Two of the
officers left to obtain a search warrant, while the four remaining officers
detained Rawlings and the other occupants.59 When the officers returned
with a search warrant, they ordered Rawlings’s companion to empty the
contents of her purse.60 Among the contents were a number of different
drugs,61 all of which Rawlings immediately claimed to own.62 The officers
52. Id. at 343.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 343. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment)). The Court noted that this additional vehicle exception did not flow
from the Chimel rationale. Id.
55. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343).
56. 448 U.S. 98, 100 (1980).
57. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 100.
58. Id.
59. Id. The police officers informed the occupants that they would be allowed to leave if
they consented to a body search. Two of the occupants did consent to such a search, and were
allowed to leave. Id.
60. Id. at 101.
61. The drugs included “a jar containing 1,800 tablets of LSD and a number of smaller
vials containing benzphetamine, methamphetamine, methyprylan, and pentobarbital.” Id.
62. Id.
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searched Rawlings, found $4,500 in cash and a knife, and then placed him
under formal arrest.63
Rawlings, as petitioner, argued several issues before the Court, including
that the search of his person was illegal.64 The Court noted that it had “no
difficulty upholding this search as incident to petitioner’s formal arrest,”65
explaining that:
Once petitioner admitted ownership of the sizable quantity of drugs found
in Cox’s purse, the police clearly had probable cause to place petitioner
under arrest. Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the
challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly
important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.66
At a minimum, Rawlings stands for the proposition that it is possible for a
search incident to arrest to precede the arrest. It did not, however, answer
the question presented in this Note: Must the officer have already decided to
make an arrest prior to commencing the search?
In Knowles v. Iowa, a police officer stopped Knowles for speeding and
issued him a citation, although the officer could have arrested him for the
violation.67 Pursuant to Iowa law,68 the officer conducted a full search of his
vehicle and discovered marijuana and a “pot pipe.”69 The officer then ar-
rested Knowles and charged him with violating Iowa’s controlled substances
law.70 He moved to suppress the evidence prior to the trial. The trial court,
however, denied his motion based on state authority.71 The Iowa Supreme
Court affirmed the constitutionality of the search, concluding that “so long
as the arresting officer had probable cause to make a custodial arrest, there
need not in fact have been a custodial arrest.”72
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Iowa Supreme Court’s reasoning
in a unanimous opinion.73 The Court’s analysis focused on the two historical
justifications for the search incident to arrest exception articulated in
Chimel: officer safety and evidence preservation.74 Noting that concerns re-
garding officer safety were still present in the case of a routine traffic stop,
63. Id.
64. Id. at 110.
65. Id. at 111.
66. Id.
67. 525 U.S. 113, 114 (1998).
68. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 115. The Court noted that section 805.1(4) of the Iowa Code
provides that the issuance of a citation instead of making an arrest “does not affect the officer’s
authority to conduct an otherwise lawful search.” Id.
69. Id. at 114.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 114–15. The Iowa Supreme Court had previously determined that this provi-
sion of the statute allows officers to conduct a “full-blown search” of the driver and his vehicle
if the police officer decides to issue a citation instead of making an arrest. Id. at 115.
72. Id. at 115–16.
73. Id. at 113, 116.
74. See id. at 116.
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the Court nevertheless determined that the danger to the officer was less,
and thus did not justify the search in this case.75 The Court also recognized
that the concerns for officer safety during an arrest are due to “the extended
exposure” of an arrest, reemphasizing that “[t]he danger to the police officer
flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and
uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest.”76 It similarly concluded
that concerns about evidence preservation were not present in the context of
issuing a citation.77
II. Varying Interpretations of the Intersection of
Rawlings and Knowles
Lower courts have diverged in their application of Rawlings v. Kentucky
and the extent to which Knowles v. Iowa complicates the analysis. This Part
argues that lower courts have generally interpreted Rawlings in three differ-
ent ways.78 Section II.A contends that three circuit courts have articulated
what I call a “two-part test”79 for evaluating the lawfulness of a search inci-
dent to arrest. Section II.B notes that there are also a number of circuits that
have not adopted a two-part test, but have held searches valid under the
Rawlings rationale. Section II.C highlights the courts that have rejected the
two-part test, in particular the Seventh Circuit.
A. The “Two-Part Test” Interpretation of Rawlings
Several courts take the view that Rawlings stands for the proposition
that a search incident to arrest may precede the arrest, so long as probable
cause existed prior to the search and an arrest followed soon after. These
courts, which include the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, have an-
nounced a two-part test. In effect, the two-part test seems to suggest that
once an officer has probable cause to arrest prior to conducting a search and
makes an arrest soon after the search, it has met its total burden. Absent
from the two-part test is a determination of whether the officer intended to
arrest before commencing the search.
The lower courts’ application of Rawlings was not the first time such a
view was advanced. Justice Harlan proposed the same idea twelve years
before the Rawlings decision in his concurrence in Sibron v. New York.80 He
75. Id. at 117.
76. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234–35,
234 n.5 (1973)).
77. Id. at 118. The Court also cited Cupp v. Murphy, which provides authority for the
proposition that an individual is less likely to attempt to destroy evidence of a crime in the
absence of an arrest. Id. at 117 (citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (“Where
there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to
take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence . . . .”)).
78. There is, naturally, some important variation in analysis in these three classifications.
79. The Tenth Circuit has described this test as a “two-part inquiry.” United States v.
Anchondo, 156 F.3d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1998).
80. See 392 U.S. 40, 77 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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took issue with the majority’s suggestion that, while it was clear that the
arrest occurred “late enough,” meaning after probable cause had developed,
“there might be a problem about whether it occurred early enough, i.e.,
before Peters was searched.”81 In Justice Harlan’s view, the Court was incor-
rect in implying that such a time sequence could make a difference. He felt
that the prosecution is only required to demonstrate that probable cause
existed prior to a search; this is a prosecutor’s “total burden.”82 California
Supreme Court Justice Traynor had articulated a similar view in 1955.83
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have adopted similar interpretations of
Rawlings. In United States v. Ilazi,84 the Eighth Circuit announced that “[a]
search is valid as incident to an arrest even if it is conducted before the
actual arrest, provided that (1) the arrest and the search are substantially
contemporaneous, and (2) probable cause to arrest existed before the
search.”85 While the Eighth Circuit decided Ilazi more than ten years before
Knowles, which could have affected the court’s analysis of Rawlings, the
Eighth Circuit has subsequently reaffirmed its reasoning from Ilazi.86 The
Ninth Circuit adopted a similar two-part analysis in United States v. Smith,87
holding that “as long as there is probable cause to make an arrest, and the
search is conducted roughly contemporaneously with the arrest, the search-
81. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 76–77.
82. Id. at 77 (concluding that there was “no case in which a defendant may validly say,
‘Although the officer had a right to arrest me at the moment when he seized me and searched
my person, the search is invalid because he did not in fact arrest me until afterwards’ ”).
83. For a discussion of California Supreme Court Justice Traynor’s view on why the
exception as understood this way may benefit an arrestee, see infra notes 160–161 and accom-
panying text.
84. 730 F.2d 1120 (8th Cir. 1984). Ilazi and Pinjoli had taken a flight from West Palm
Beach, Florida to the Minneapolis–St. Paul International Airport. Ilazi, 730 F.2d at 1121. Sev-
eral airport officials observed the pair deplaning, and noticed that they had glassy eyes and
were walking slowly and staggering. Id. Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Special
Agent Olby and Airport Police Department Officer Mortensen approached Pinjoli and Ilazi,
informing both that they were not under arrest and were free to leave, and then requested their
identification. Id. at 1122. Pinjoli did not have identification, and claimed that he had lost his
immigration papers in a swimming pool in Florida. Id. Ilazi did, and handed the officers an
Immigration and Naturalization Service form and a driver’s license. Id. Both men were travel-
ing without luggage. Id. Agent Olby and Officer Mortensen then thanked the men and left to
inform Agents Lewis and Kramer about their interaction with Ilazi and Pinjoli. Id. Agents
Lewis and Kramer then approached Ilazi and Pinjoli. Id. at 1123. During the interaction, the
Agent Lewis noticed a bulge in Ilazi’s right sock, because his boot was unzipped. Id. Agent
Lewis reached for the bulge, and Ilazi “jumped back” when Lewis touched the boot. Id. The
men were told they were under arrest and were subsequently searched. Id. Two bags of cocaine
were found in Ilazi’s boots and a third bag was found in his underwear. Id.
85. Id. at 1126 (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980)).
86. See United States v. Brooks, 290 F. App’x 955, 960 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“The
search of [defendant]’s person was justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest, which is
valid ‘even if it is conducted before the actual arrest, provided that (1) the arrest and the
search are substantially contemporaneous, and (2) probable cause to arrest existed before the
search.’ ” (quoting Ilazi, 730 F.2d at 1126)). Brooks also makes no mention of Knowles.
87. 389 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2004). Smith was pulled over for driving ninety-six miles per
hour with his high beam lights on. Smith, 389 F.3d at 946. Smith told the officers that he did
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incident-to-arrest doctrine applies and no warrant is required.”88 Notably,
Smith represented an extension from earlier Ninth Circuit cases by “specifi-
cally h[olding] that the warrantless search of a vehicle . . . may precede the
arrest.”89 The court noted that it did not see a sound basis for treating the
situations in the two cases differently.90
The Tenth Circuit has taken the most expansive interpretation of Rawl-
ings of all the circuit courts. In United States v. Anchondo,91 the Tenth Circuit
relied on Rawlings to announce a rule similar to those articulated in Ilazi
and Smith.92 According to the Tenth Circuit, “[a] warrantless search preced-
ing an arrest is a legitimate ‘search incident to arrest’ as long as (1) a legiti-
mate basis for the arrest existed before the search, and (2) the arrest followed
shortly after the search.”93 The court’s analysis, however, went one step be-
yond the Eighth and Ninth Circuits by further holding that “[w]hether or
not the officer intended to actually arrest the defendant at the time of the
search is immaterial to this two-part inquiry.”94 Although Ilazi and Smith
make no mention of either intent to arrest or Knowles in their analyses,95
neither do the opinions explicitly foreclose an examination of the officer’s
not have identification on him, but that he was registered in Arizona. Id. The officers con-
tacted dispatch to determine whether the California or Arizona driver’s license databases con-
tained a license that matched the information Smith gave him, but found no match. Id. The
officers then asked Smith for his social security number. Id. at 947. Using the social security
number, dispatch notified the officers that the number corresponded to a Vernon Smith, who
was listed as having brown hair and eyes, being six feet tall, and weighing 200 pounds. Id. The
officers observed that this description did not match Smith and informed him of the discrep-
ancy. Id. While one of the officers continued to question Smith, the other began to search the
vehicle for Smith’s identification and located a wallet. Id. Eventually it was revealed that he had
given the officers his brother’s information. Id. Smith was subsequently arrested for imperson-
ation. Id.
88. Id. at 952. Smith likewise made no mention of Knowles.
89. Id.
90. Id. This Note contends that the warrantless search of a person incident to arrest is in
fact different from a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest. See discussion infra
Section III.B.
91. 156 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir. 1998). Anchondo and his passenger were stopped at a
checkpoint near the Mexican border. Anchondo, 156 F.3d at 1044. While a border patrol agent
asked Anchondo routine questions, a canine alerted to the presence of illegal narcotics in the
vehicle. Id. The agents requested Anchondo move his vehicle to a secondary inspection area to
explore the dog’s alert, to which Anchondo consented. Id. Finding no contraband in the vehi-
cle, one of the agents conducted a “pat and frisk” of Anchondo. Id. at 1044–45. He felt a hard
object in Anchondo’s waistline, and, believing it to be a handgun, he removed it. Id. at 1045.
The object was in fact a package of cocaine that was strapped to his stomach. Id. Three other
packages were removed. Id.
92. Id. at 1045.
93. Id.
94. Id. In a case decided after Anchondo, the Tenth Circuit cited Knowles for support that
“there can be no search incident to arrest unless the suspect is at some point formally placed
under arrest.” United States v. Sanchez, 555 F.3d 910, 921 (10th Cir. 2009).
95. Indeed, it would have been impossible for the Ilazi court to cite Knowles, as it oc-
curred several years before Knowles.
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intent to actually arrest the defendant at the time of the search as part of the
two-part test.
B. Searches Valid Under Rawlings Rationale Interpretation
Other courts have used Rawlings to uphold searches that precede arrests,
but have done so without adopting a two-part test. The courts in this group
have varied in their analyses of Rawlings and the impact Knowles has on this
question.
Some courts, including the First, Second, and Third Circuits, use Rawl-
ings to uphold searches made prior to arrests without much analysis. These
decisions generally adhere to the following pattern:
[Provides summary of the facts]. Once the defendant did X, the officer had
probable cause to arrest him for Y offense. A formal arrest followed the
search. So long as the “formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the
challenged search [it is not] particularly important that the search preceded
the arrest rather than vice versa.” Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111
(1980).96
These courts have not promulgated a two-part test for trial courts to use in
suppression hearings,97 nor have they engaged with the interaction between
Rawlings and Knowles. Rather, they consider the facts and conclude that
Rawlings permits such a search.
Two Circuits, the Sixth and the D.C. Circuit, have probed the intersec-
tion of Rawlings and Knowles. In United States v. Williams,98 the Sixth Circuit
seemed to adopt the two-part test described in Section II.A, stating that “[a]
warrantless search that precedes an arrest may be constitutionally valid as
long as (1) a legitimate basis for the arrest existed before the search, and (2)
96. See, e.g., United States v. Madriz, 532 F. App’x 353, 355 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
police had probable cause to arrest Madriz for conspiracy to distribute narcotics prior to the
second pat down by Officer Peterson. Therefore, even though that search preceded Madriz’s
formal arrest, the search was nonetheless justified as a search incident to his arrest.” (citing
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980))); United States v. Donaldson, 793 F.2d 498,
503 (2d Cir. 1986).
97. For a discussion of courts that have opted to use a two-part analysis, see supra Sec-
tion II.A.
98. 170 F. App’x 399 (6th Cir. 2006). Two officers observed a vehicle with an unlocked
trunk that matched the description of a car that had been reported stolen earlier that day.
Williams, 170 F. App’x at 401. The police officers followed the car, and, when the driver failed
to stop at a stop sign, pulled over the car. Id. The officers ordered Williams out of the car and
requested his license after patting him down for weapons. Id. Williams produced his parole
card instead. Id. The officers then placed Williams in the back of their squad car while they
searched his vehicle. Id. At some point during the search, either in the initial pat down or in
the subsequent search of the car, the officers “discovered a clip, a 380 magazine with six
rounds in the magazine.” Id. The officers also learned that Williams did not have a driver’s
license in his name. Id. The officers advised Williams of his rights and, after he signed a waiver
of rights form, questioned Williams. Id. The officers then issued him a misdemeanor citation
for failing to stop at a stop sign and driving without a license, and then they released him. Id.
Some time later, a federal grand jury indicted Williams with being a convicted felon in posses-
sion of ammunition. Id. The trial court denied his motion to suppress. Id.
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the arrest followed ‘quickly on the heels . . . of the challenged search.’ ”99 But
the court went on to discuss its view of the Rawlings holding, noting that
one could argue that the “literal language of Rawlings” permits an officer to
search an individual’s vehicle during the course of a routine traffic stop,
arrest the individual upon discovering contraband, and “validate the search
by testifying that he arrested the suspect for the misdemeanor traffic of-
fense.”100 The court concluded that such an interpretation was both contrary
to the holding of Rawlings and to the Fourth Amendment.101
The Sixth Circuit also took steps to distinguish the case before it from
Knowles. The court observed that in the case before it, the officers had taken
“preliminary steps towards a formal arrest” prior to conducting the search,
whereas in Knowles, the officer did not take steps to effectuate the arrest
until after he had completed the search.102 The court concluded that Rawl-
ings was more analogous to the present situation, and upheld the search.103
The Sixth Circuit thus seemed to suggest that the distinction between Rawl-
ings-land and Knowles-land turns on whether “the officers took preliminary
steps towards a formal arrest based upon existing probable cause” before
conducting the search.104
The D.C. Circuit is the only circuit court to have addressed whether
validating a search under the Rawlings rationale severs the search incident to
arrest exception from its two justifications.105 Sitting en banc in United States
v. Powell, the court considered Powell’s argument that Rawlings only permits
a search to precede an arrest when the search followed a custodial arrest.106
While the court recognized that Rawlings was “detained” for forty-five min-
utes prior to the search and subsequent “formal arrest,” it concluded that
99. Id. at 404.
100. Id. at 404–05.
101. Id. at 405.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. One could make the argument that this should place the Sixth Circuit in category
three instead. Because the Sixth Circuit has not expanded on its opinion in Williams, however,
I have decided to provide a more conservative assessment.
105. See United States v. Powell, 483 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). Three officers in
an unmarked police car observed Powell and another man urinating near a parked car in an
industrial area. Id. at 837. The officers stopped the car near the men. Two of the officers
walked to the men who had been urinating, while the third officer, seeing a third man sitting
in the parked vehicle, approached the vehicle on the driver’s side. Id. The two officers detained
the men who were outside the car because “ ‘they were going to be placed under arrest’ for
urinating in public.” Id. The third officer leant through an open window in the car and ob-
served three cups containing a yellowish liquid. He testified that he concluded the cups con-
tained alcohol based on the smell. Id. The officer ordered the passenger out of the vehicle
“with the intention of arresting him for possession of an open container of alcohol in a vehicle
upon a public way.” Id. He then proceeded to search the vehicle, finding a capped cognac
bottle and a backpack, inside which he discovered “an Intertech 9 semi-automatic pistol with
23 rounds in the magazine and one round in the chamber.” Id. The men were then taken into
custody. Id. at 838.
106. Id. at 840–41.
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this prior detention was irrelevant because the Rawlings Court did not sug-
gest that “the lawfulness of the search turned upon the suspect being in
custody before he was searched.”107 The Powell court then rejected the argu-
ment that without such a custodial arrest requirement, the exception would
no longer be tethered to its justifications, contending that concerns for evi-
dence preservation and officer safety “are greater before the police have
taken a suspect into custody than they are thereafter.”108 Finally, addressing
the argument that the court’s decision was inconsistent with Knowles, the
D.C. Circuit clarified that “having probable cause to arrest is [not] by itself
sufficient to bring a search within the Belton exception to the warrant re-
quirement,”109 emphasizing that “it is the ‘fact of the arrest’ that makes all
the difference.”110
C. Intent to Arrest Requirement Interpretation of Rawlings
A minority of courts has held that mere probable cause to arrest and an
arrest thereafter is insufficient to justify a search incident to arrest. These
courts likewise vary in their analyses of what the Fourth Amendment de-
mands, and reach different conclusions regarding when, if ever, an officer
may search before making an arrest.
The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit court to have held a search inci-
dent to arrest invalid on the grounds that the defendant was not “under
custodial arrest” at the time of the search.111 The court evaluated the ques-
tion of when a search may precede an arrest in the context of a vehicle
search, often termed a Belton search, in Ochana v. Flores.112 The court noted
that Knowles stands for the proposition that police officers may not search a
vehicle during the course of a traffic stop, even if the officer has “probable
cause to arrest the driver for the traffic violation.”113 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that “[i]n order to conduct a Belton search, the occupant of the
vehicle must actually be held under custodial arrest.”114 The court noted that
Ochana “was not told that he was under arrest; he was not handcuffed or
frisked; and no sobriety test was conducted.”115 It thus appears that, at least
107. Id. at 840.
108. Id. at 840–41.
109. Id. at 841.
110. Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973)).
111. Ochana v. Flores, 347 F.3d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 2003); see supra note 3 (highlighting the
divergence in interpretations among the circuits and citing Ochana for the holding that a
search incident to arrest is invalid if a defendant is not under custodial arrest at the time of the
search).
112. Ochana, 347 F.3d at 270.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. While it is possible that the Seventh Circuit could limit the custodial arrest re-
quirement to searches of a vehicle incident to arrest, the Ochana opinion suggests that this
requirement would extend to other contexts. The court noted that the search incident to arrest
exception “turn[s] on the objective belief of a reasonable person in the suspect’s position.” Id.
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in the context of a vehicle search, a search may not precede an arrest if the
individual is not already under custodial arrest. Notably, the Seventh Circuit
did not mention Rawlings in its analysis of the issue.116
Several state supreme courts also fall into this third category. The New
York Court of Appeals held in People v. Reid that the search incident to
arrest exception “requires proof that, at the time of the search, an arrest has
already occurred or is about to occur.”117 In the event that the arrest has not
yet occurred, “the officer must have intended to make [an arrest]” in order
to trigger the exception.118 The Court of Appeals reasoned that a search can-
not be justified as a search incident to arrest if, but for the search, the officer
would not have arrested the individual.119 The court based its analysis on
Knowles, noting that “[t]he problem, in Knowles as here, was that the search
caused the arrest and not the other way around.”120
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has also invalidated a search incident
to arrest on the grounds that the defendant was not under arrest at the time
the officer conducted the search.121 In State v. Crutcher, a police officer ob-
served three motorcyclists driving at excessive speeds.122 He successfully pul-
led over two of the motorcyclists, but the third attempted to evade the
officer.123 In his attempt to flee, Crutcher crashed and was thrown from his
motorcycle.124 The officer testified that “upon reaching [Crutcher], he placed
one arm behind [Crutcher’s] back” because he “intended to arrest him for
reckless endangerment and evading arrest.”125 However, because Crutcher
complained of his injuries, the officer did not handcuff him, and instead
called for medical assistance.126 The officer testified that while they waited
for an ambulance, he did not take any further steps to arrest Crutcher, and a
second officer at the scene testified that they had agreed to allow Crutcher’s
friend to remove his motorcycle.127 Before releasing the motorcycle to his
friend, however, the officers conducted a search of a backpack and jacket
that were located on the motorcycle.128 The search produced a .38 caliber
Additionally, as I discuss in Part III, it seems likely that in the case of the search of a person,
the search itself would simultaneously provide the person with “reason to believe that he was
under custodial arrest.” Id.
116. See United States v. Powell, 483 F.3d 836, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Only the Seventh
Circuit has held that a Belton search may not precede a custodial arrest, but it did so in an
opinion that betrayed no awareness of the Supreme Court’s holding in Rawlings.”).
117. 26 N.E.3d 237, 240 (N.Y. 2014).
118. Reid, 26 N.E.3d at 240.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 297–98 (Tenn. 1999).







October 2016] Search Incident to Probable Cause? 125
handgun and a pill bottle, the contents of which were later determined to be
cocaine.129
The court considered whether Crutcher was under arrest at the time the
officers searched his jacket and backpack.130 The court noted that Tennessee
requires an “actual restraint on the arrestee’s freedom of movement” in or-
der to constitute an arrest.131 Recognizing that this case presented a close
call, the court nevertheless concluded that Crutcher was not under arrest
when the officers searched his jacket and backpack.132 Because the court de-
termined that Crutcher was not under arrest at the time of the search, the
court reasoned that the search was not incident to arrest.133 The majority
engaged with Rawlings in a footnote, but ultimately rejected its
applicability.134
III. A Proposal for a New Rule
This Part argues that the Supreme Court should settle the lower courts’
varied interpretations of Rawlings v. Kentucky and Knowles v. Iowa and an-
swer the unresolved question: Must an officer have already decided to make
an arrest prior to commencing a search? It suggests a way for the Court to
resolve this question that takes into account both the justifications for the
exception and the practical consequences of the varying lower court inter-
pretations. This Part contends that the Supreme Court should hold that in
order for a search incident to arrest to be valid, the officer must intend to
make an arrest before commencing the search. Section III.A argues that
many lower courts’ interpretations of Rawlings have untethered the rule
from its justifications. This rule would re-tether the exception to the Chimel
rationales. Section III.B contends that the proposed rule would also serve an
important practical function, as it would guard against transforming the
exception into a search incident to probable cause exception. Section III.C
addresses the counterargument that this rule is precluded by a line of Su-
preme Court cases that prohibit evaluating an officer’s subjective intent, and
argues that this does not prevent courts from considering whether the of-
ficer intended to arrest the individual searched.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 299. The State conceded that the officers did not have authority to conduct an
inventory search. Id.
131. Id. at 301–02.
132. Id. at 302. The court considered the officer’s testimony that “he did not arrest the
appellee due to the appellee’s injuries,” that he did not discuss criminal charges or an arrest
with Crutcher after he had asked the officers what was going to happen to him, and that there
was no other evidence that Crutcher was being detained for reasons other than to be trans-
ported to the hospital. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 302 n.12.
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A. The Exception’s Justifications Provide Support for the New Rule
As discussed in Part I, the two justifications for the search incident to
arrest exception are officer safety and evidence preservation. The Court has
adopted a bright-line rule for this exception, noting that these two concerns
“flow[ ] from the fact of the arrest.”135 The Supreme Court has not suggested
that mere probable cause to arrest triggers the concerns that justify the
search.136 It has also repeatedly emphasized the importance of ensuring that
the rule does not become “untether[ed] . . . from the justifications underly-
ing the Chimel exception.”137
The two-part test is at odds with, and untethers the rule from, the two
justifications for the exception. It sanctions a search on the basis of probable
cause alone so long as an officer, after conducting the search, makes an ar-
rest. Courts that summarily uphold searches made prior to arrest under the
authority of Rawlings also risk untethering the rule from its justifications.
The lack of analysis in these opinions provides unclear guidance to trial
courts. And it risks implying that an officer may search a person if he or she
has probable cause for a pedestrian offense and arrest the person if he or she
finds contraband, validating the search on the basis of probable cause for the
misdemeanor offense.138
The justifications for the exception are based on the fact of the arrest,
not the existence of probable cause. As the Court has repeatedly emphasized,
the dangers to officer safety that justify the search incident to arrest excep-
tion stem from the arrest itself: “[T]he danger to the police officer flows
from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncer-
tainty, and not from the grounds for arrest.”139 The Court has likewise rec-
ognized that the second justification, concerns about the preservation of
evidence, also flows from the arrest itself. In Cupp v. Murphy,140 a defendant
who had voluntarily agreed to talk to the police about his wife’s murder was
subjected to a warrantless and nonconsensual fingernail scraping.141 The
Court held that because the defendant was not under arrest at the time of
the search, the circumstances did not justify a full Chimel search.142 The
135. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973).
136. Note that the D.C. Circuit has put forth this argument in United States v. Powell. 483
F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2007). If the Supreme Court were to adopt the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning,
that the concerns for officer safety and evidence preservation “are greater before the police
have taken a suspect into custody than they are thereafter,” Powell, 483 F.3d at 840–41, I
concede that the justifications would be re-tethered to the Chimel justifications.
137. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 343 (2009)).
138. See United States v. Williams, 170 F. App’x 399, 404–05 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing
that the “literal language of Rawlings” would permit such an interpretation).
139. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 n.5).
140. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
141. Cupp, 412 U.S. at 292.
142. Id. at 296. The search was later deemed valid under the exigent circumstances excep-
tion. Id.
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Court explained that “[w]here there is no formal arrest . . . a person might
well be less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incrimi-
nating evidence.”143
A search justified by the existence of probable cause alone thus appears
impermissible because it is the arrest not probable cause that triggers the
two concerns that justify the search. Without an arrest, there is little incen-
tive for the individual to injure the officer in an attempt to flee or to destroy
or conceal evidence. The rule is untethered from its justification.144
To re-tether the rule to its justifications, this Note proposes a new rule:
in order for a search incident to arrest that occurs prior to the arrest to be
valid, the officer must intend to make an arrest before commencing the
search. This requisite intent should be inferred from the objective circum-
stances of the interaction between the officer and the arrestee. Courts may
presume intent to arrest if the officer takes “preliminary steps towards a
formal arrest” prior to or contemporaneous with conducting a search.145
Such steps may include frisking, handcuffing, or placing the person in the
squad car, or telling him that he’s under arrest.
When an officer fails to convey intent to arrest through his or her words
or actions, the concern for officer safety and evidence preservation that jus-
tify the search incident to arrest exception are not triggered. When, however,
an officer takes preliminary steps toward a formal arrest, the concerns justi-
fying the search incident to arrest exception are immediately triggered.146
Upon realizing that arrest is imminent, an individual will be likely to at-
tempt to escape, injure the officer, or conceal or destroy evidence.147 Indeed,
concerns for officer safety and evidence preservation may be at their greatest
during the time in which an arrest is imminent.148
143. Id.
144. See Logan, supra note 6, at 409 (warning of the problems created by “conflat[ing] the
significance of probable cause with that of actual arrest”).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 170 F. App’x 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2006) (distin-
guishing the case at hand from Knowles on the basis that, in Knowles, “the officers took no
steps towards effectuating an arrest until after the search had concluded”).
146. See Williams, 170 F. App’x at 405; State v. Hart, 639 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Wis. Ct. App.
2001), overruled by State v. Sykes, 695 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Wis. 2005). One court has provided
the following explanation:
Where there is no custodial arrest, however, these underlying rationales for a search inci-
dent to an arrest do not exist. An individual who does not believe that he has been
arrested has no need to effect an escape or to harm the police officer that has detained
him. Moreover, an individual who does not believe that he has been arrested has little or
no need to destroy evidence and, thus, almost certainly will not destroy evidence that
might be in his possession. Therefore, an officer’s objective ‘manifestation of purpose and
authority’ at the ‘moment of arrest,’ by words or conduct, which signal to an individual
that he or she is under arrest, will be, and always has been, significant in determining
whether a custodial arrest has occurred in Maryland.
Belote v. State, 981 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Md. 2009) (quoting Logan, supra note 6, at 431–32).
147. See Belote, 981 A.2d at 1252.
148. United States v. Powell, 483 F.3d 836, 840–41 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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This Note does not advocate the approach taken by the Tennessee Su-
preme Court. Although this Note does not support an interpretation of
Rawlings that permits a search incident to arrest under the two-part test, it
also does not support adoption of a rule that ignores Rawlings. The Court
has emphasized time and again that it is not the job of the courts to
micromanage the scene of an arrest.149 Rawlings appears to provide officers
flexibility in the field when, to promote officer safety and the preservation of
evidence, it is appropriate to search an individual before placing him or her
under formal arrest.150
B. Practical Concerns Provide Support for the New Rule
Those that are skeptical of the rule argued for here may question why
this issue even deserves consideration by the Supreme Court. Some may
argue that it does not demand attention because an intrusion should be
justified by the fact that the officer had probable cause to arrest for a crime
in the first place.151 This Section explains the practical danger of allowing the
search incident to arrest exception to transform into a search incident to
probable cause exception.
A search incident to probable cause exception would provide officers
with an incredible amount of discretion to conduct a search. The language
of the two-part test, for example, authorizes an officer to search an individ-
ual and their area of immediate control for a misdemeanor offense and ar-
rest the individual if contraband is found, validating the search as incident
to arrest for the misdemeanor.152 Arguably, upholding searches under “the
literal language of Rawlings” without any further analysis also permits such a
search.153 Aside from untethering the rule from its justifications, this inter-
pretation of Rawlings affords officers enormous discretion to search, and this
discretion is subject to abuse.154 For illustrative purposes, consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical: A driver is pulled over for a traffic violation, let’s say
failing to stop at a stop sign. The officer asks the driver to step out of the
vehicle, but does not place him into the squad car or handcuff him. The
officer then conducts a search of the passenger compartment, and finds a
149. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 773–74 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“An
arrest itself may often create an emergency situation making it impracticable to obtain a war-
rant before embarking on a related search.”).
150. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491–92 (2014) (emphasizing the
Court’s “general preference to provide clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical
rules”). The Court cited the Michigan v. Summers as support for this preference. 452 U.S. 692,
705 n.19 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219–220 (1979) (White, J.,
concurring)).
151. This would appear to be Justice Harlan’s view. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 77 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
152. See United States v. Williams, 170 F. App’x 399, 404–05 (6th Cir. 2006).
153. Id. at 404.
154. Id.
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backpack containing several bags of cocaine. Only then does the officer de-
cide to arrest the driver, charging him for failing to stop at the stop sign and
possession of cocaine. Probable cause to arrest for failure to stop at the stop
sign existed before the search,155 and an arrest followed quickly thereafter. In
at least three circuits, the cocaine evidence would be admissible as a search
incident to arrest.156
Now, consider a second hypothetical: Once again, a driver is pulled over
for failing to stop at a stop sign. The officer asks the driver to step out of the
vehicle, but does not place the individual into the squad car or handcuff
him. The officer then conducts a search of the passenger compartment; the
search reveals no contraband. Must the officer arrest the individual for fail-
ure to stop at a stop sign in order to validate the search? If the officer does
not make a subsequent arrest, the search would appear to be unreasonable
and a violation of the Fourth Amendment. This hypothetical demonstrates
the danger of granting such broad authority to search.
In order to fully understand that potential for abuse, it is useful to con-
sider in what circumstances the two-part test would be most prone to abuse.
This Note’s proposed rule would require officers to intend to make an arrest
prior to the search, which courts can determine by evaluating whether the
officer took “preliminary steps towards a formal arrest”157 before conducting
a search. Section III.A noted that these preliminary steps include frisking,
handcuffing, or placing the arrestee in the squad car, or telling him that he’s
under arrest. Because frisking a person is a preliminary step towards making
an arrest, a search of the arrestee’s person may contemporaneously be con-
sidered a preliminary step in making the arrest and a search.158
The ability to contemporaneously search and arrest a person suggests
that the circumstances in which the two-part test is most likely to be abused
is in the automotive context. Unlike in the case of the search of an arrestee’s
person, the search of a vehicle cannot be viewed as incident to a contempo-
raneous arrest. Compounded with this is the reality that there are myriad
155. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has proba-
ble cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his
presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”).
156. See, e.g, United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 952 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Anchondo, 156 F.3d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ilazi, 730 F.2d 1120,
1126–27 (10th Cir. 1984). While this is an extreme example of the level of abuse such an
articulation of Rawlings is subject to, consider State v. Cornell, 491 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992). In Cornell, Cornell was pulled over for driving ninety miles per hour in a fifty-
five miles per hour zone and was placed in the squad car. He admitted to smoking marijuana
thirty minutes before driving, but denied having marijuana on him. Id. at 669. After issuing a
speeding ticket and deciding to release Cornell, the police officer conducted a search of Cornell
and found a bag of marijuana. Id. In his testimony, the police officer stated “that he decided to
arrest him upon finding the marijuana.” Id. The court upheld the search on the basis that
probable cause existed prior to conducting the search and the arrest and search were substan-
tially contemporaneous. Id. at 671.
157. Williams, 170 F. App’x at 405.
158. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (noting that an arrest justifies a
“contemporaneous search”).
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potential traffic violations, and full compliance with all regulations at all
times is incredibly difficult, if not impossible. This is not to argue that an
officer who has probable cause to stop a motorist must not act on that prob-
able cause unless a reasonable officer would have also made such a stop.159
This fact, however, highlights that the two-part test will be particularly sus-
ceptible to abuse in the context of a routine traffic violation.
Of course, there are arguably costs to such a rule. California Supreme
Court Justice Traynor took a position similar to the two-part test in 1955.160
He argued that a rule like this would be advantageous to an innocent person,
because the search would be able to convince the police officer that, while
probable cause might have existed, that belief was erroneous.161 While this
feature of the two-part test may be advantageous for some individuals, these
advantages do not appear to outweigh the risk of abuse.
C. Whren Does Not Preclude the New Rule
Courts generally dismiss arguments that a search incident to arrest was
invalid because the officer did not intend to make an arrest prior to com-
mencing the search.162 Courts base this conclusion on Whren v. United
States163 and subsequent Supreme Court cases that make clear that “[t]he
officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant.”164
Whren has been criticized for allowing pretextual searches, and many
advocate for the Court to overrule its opinion.165 Despite this sharp critique,
the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Whren was unanimous and
that the Court has gone on to reaffirm its reasoning in subsequent decisions
indicates that Whren is likely here to stay. Thus, instead of attacking the
holding in Whren to support the intent requirement of the rule, this Note
provides an alternate reading to Whren, and argues that one may read a
distinction between subjective motivations and intent.
159. Such an argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 819 (1996).
160. People v. Simon, 290 P.2d 531, 533 (Cal. 1955) (“[I]f the officer is entitled to make
an arrest on the basis of information available to him before he searches, and as an incident to
that arrest is entitled to make a reasonable search of the person arrested and the place where
he is arrested, there is nothing unreasonable in his conduct if he makes the search before
instead of after the arrest.”).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Knop v. State, No. 11–0692, 2012 WL 3589980, at *3–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug.
22, 2012); State v. Sherman, 931 So.2d 286, 297 (La. 2006); State v. O’Neal, 921 A.2d 1079,
1086–87 (N.J. 2007).
163. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
164. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006); see, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.
Ct. 2074 (2011); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
165. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.4(f) (5th. ed. 2015) (criticizing
the effects of Whren on pretextual arrests); Mark M. Dobson, The Police, Pretextual Investiga-
tory Activity, and the Fourth Amendment: What Hath Whren Wrought?, 9 St. Thomas L. Rev.
707, 742 (arguing that the approach adopted by the Court in Whren will encourage arbitrary
and invasive police action).
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Officers stopped the defendants in Whren, who were both African
American, for committing a traffic violation.166 Upon approaching the
driver’s side window, the officer observed two bags of crack cocaine.167 Both
men were arrested, charged, and convicted with various federal drug laws.168
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendants agreed that the police of-
ficers had probable cause to believe multiple traffic violations had been
made, but argued that the test for traffic stops should not be based solely on
whether there was probable cause to justify a stop.169 Rather, the defendants
contended, a traffic stop’s reasonableness should be based on “whether a
police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason
given.”170 They argued that because there are so many potential traffic viola-
tions and compliance with all is unlikely, a police officer will almost always
be able to find that a motorist has violated a traffic regulation.171 This reality,
defendants argued, “creates the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of
investigating other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even
articulable suspicion exists.”172
The Court rejected the defendants’ argument, noting that there is no
principle “that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifia-
ble on the basis of probable cause.”173 The Court stated further that the
constitutionality “of traffic stops [does not] depend[ ] on the actual motiva-
tions of the individual officers involved.”174 It also explained that this princi-
ple is not based on the “evidentiary difficulty of establishing subjective
intent,” but rather on the basis that Fourth Amendment “ ‘reasonableness’
allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the sub-
jective intent.”175
166. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808, 810. In Whren, plainclothed police officers were on patrol
when they observed a vehicle waiting at an intersection for “an unusually long time.” Id. at
808. When the unmarked police car turned around to head back toward the vehicle, the vehicle
suddenly turned, without signaling, and began traveling “at an ‘unreasonable’ speed.” Id. The
police officers pulled up alongside of the vehicle when it was stopped at a red light, and one of
the officers stepped out of the car to direct the driver to put the vehicle in park. Id. As the
officer approached the window, he observed two large bags of cocaine. Id. at 808–09. The two
occupants of the vehicle, both of whom were African American, were arrested after this discov-
ery. Id. at 809–10.
167. Id. at 808–09.
168. Id. at 809.




173. Id. at 811.
174. Id. at 813.
175. Id. at 814.
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Whren’s reasoning has been subsequently reaffirmed in several Supreme
Court decisions: Devenpeck v. Alford,176 Brigham City v. Stuart,177 and Ash-
croft v. al-Kidd.178 In Brigham City, the Court stated that “[a]n action is
‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual of-
ficer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
[the] action.’ ”179 The Court concluded that it did not matter whether the
officers’ subjective motives for engaging in the action—entering a private
residence—were “to arrest respondents and gather evidence against them or
to assist the injured and prevent further violence.”180
One may make a distinction between an officer’s subjective motivations
or reasons for making an arrest and an officer’s intent to arrest as judged by
the circumstances, viewed objectively. When the Court has held that the
subjective intent of an officer is irrelevant, it has always referred to the rea-
sons why the officer made the arrest.181 Courts are foreclosed from examin-
ing an officer’s subjective motivations to determine if a search incident to
arrest was pretextual, but courts are not necessarily precluded from evaluat-
ing whether an officer intended to arrest, as judged by the objective circum-
stances. While the former examination necessarily invites inquiries into an
officer’s state of mind,182 the latter can and is judged by the circumstances.183
The Court noted in Whren that it had never endorsed a principle that an
officer’s actions that are “justifiable on the basis of probable cause” could be
invalidated because the officer had an ulterior motive.184 But a search inci-
dent to arrest is not justifiable on the basis of probable cause. A search inci-
dent to arrest is, instead, justifiable on the basis of the arrest. Whren may not
necessarily preclude an inquiry into whether or not the officer intended to
make an arrest prior to commencing the search, because the search incident
to arrest intrusion is impermissible without an arrest. In this context, it is
not a question of whether the arrest itself would be unconstitutional because
of an officer’s alleged pretextual use of probable cause to arrest, but rather
whether the search is unconstitutional because the officer had not yet de-
cided that an arrest was going to be made.
Evaluating searches incident to arrest in this way not only guards against
searches made based on probable cause, but against searches made without
176. 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
177. 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
178. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
179. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404 (second alteration in the original) (quoting Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
180. Id. at 405.
181. See, e.g., al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2082–83 (refraining from looking to motives such as
racial profiling, which points to a reason why the officer may have made the arrest);
Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 154–56 (discussing how looking into why the officer may have made
the arrest would lead to arbitrary results).
182. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404.
183. See Logan, supra note 6, at 432.
184. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996).
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the intent to make an arrest. Such inquiries also re-tether the rule to its
justifications.
There is Supreme Court authority for the proposition that courts may
evaluate whether or not an officer intended to make an arrest. In County of
Sacramento v. Lewis,185 the Supreme Court recognized that a seizure only
occurs “when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement
through means intentionally applied.”186 This not only permits, but requires
courts to consider whether the officer intended to seize an individual. That it
is necessary to determine whether an officer has intentionally applied a re-
striction on the freedom of movement in the context of finding a seizure
suggests that it is proper to determine whether an officer intentionally took
steps toward a formal arrest before conducting a search.
Conclusion
Tension between two Supreme Court cases has led to differing answers
on a crucial Fourth Amendment question. This issue is important to resolve
because several of the current interpretations risk transforming the search
incident to arrest exception into a search incident to probable cause excep-
tion. The two-part test in particular threatens to erode crucial Fourth
Amendment protections by granting police officers exceptional discretion to
search an individual and their area of immediate control.
In order to protect Fourth Amendment protections, the Supreme Court
should resolve the tension between Rawlings and Knowles and adopt a new
rule: for a search incident to arrest to be valid, the officer must intend to
make an arrest before commencing the search. This rule would re-tether the
exception to its justifications and take into account important practical con-
siderations. It would guard against police officer abuse by forbidding
searches made on the basis of probable cause alone, while still affording
officers flexibility in the field when, to promote officer safety and the preser-
vation of evidence, it is appropriate to search an individual before placing
him or her under formal arrest.
185. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
186. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844 (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97
(1989)).
